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ABSTRACT
Software Defined Networking (SDN) is a new networking
architecture which aims to provide better decoupling between
network control (control plane) and data forwarding func-
tionalities (data plane). This separation introduces several
benefits, such as a directly programmable and (virtually)
centralized network control. However, researchers showed
that the required communication channel between the control
and data plane of SDN creates a potential bottleneck in the
system, introducing new vulnerabilities. Indeed, this behav-
ior could be exploited to mount powerful attacks, such as
the control plane saturation attack, that can severely hinder
the performance of the whole network.
In this paper we present LineSwitch, an efficient and
effective solution against control plane saturation attack.
LineSwitch combines SYN proxy techniques and probabilistic
blacklisting of network traffic. We implemented LineSwitch
as an extension of OpenFlow, the current reference implemen-
tation of SDN, and evaluate our solution considering different
traffic scenarios (with and without attack). The results of
our preliminary experiments confirm that, compared to the
state-of-the-art, LineSwitch reduces the time overhead up to
30%, while ensuring the same level of protection.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Security
and protection
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1. INTRODUCTION
The great increase in demand for flexibility and automa-
tion in key Information Technology sectors is leading to the
rise of new paradigms that greatly simplify the manage-
ment of network infrastructures. One of such paradigms is
Software Defined Networking (SDN). Unlike the current net-
work infrastructure, SDN decouples the network layer (i.e.,
the control plane) and the data layer (i.e., the data plane)
functionalities in separate entities. This separation allows a
(virtually) centralized and directly programmable network
control, while at the same time reduces and abstracts the
complexity of network devices.
The most widely adopted instantiation of the SDN
paradigm is OpenFlow (OF) [11, 2]. OF provides a standard
communication interface between the data plane, and the
control plane, and introduces the concept of flows to identify
the network traffic [2]. Each OpenFlow entity, namely OF
switch, maintains a set of flow tables. They specify the rules
that the OF switch uses to perform the routing of packets.
Moreover, flow tables are organized in a pipeline, which is
traversed by the switch every time a packet is received. The
control plane can program the flow tables of the OF switches
either statically or dynamically. In the latter case, if an OF
switch does not have a matching rule in its pipeline for a
new incoming packet, it must contact the control plane to re-
trieve a new rule [1]. Unfortunately, while enabling a flexible
network management, the required extensive communication
between control and data plane might result in poor scalabil-
ity. Moreover, it introduces a serious vulnerability that can
be exploited to overload the control plane with flow requests:
the resulting attack is called control plane saturation [17,
8], and can be easily performed, for example, through SYN
flooding [15]. By overloading the control plane, this attack
incapacitates the target OF switch, which will not be able
to retrieve rules for new network flows. Furthermore, if the
controller manages more than a single switch, the attacker
might hinder an even larger part of the network [17, 9, 8, 6].
Recently, Shin et al. [17] proposed Avant-Guard, a
countermeasure against the control plane saturation attack.
Avant-Guard introduces a new module into the OF switch,
called connection migration module, which protects the
switch and the controller from saturation attacks performed
by SYN flooding, while at the same time being transpar-
ent to the end hosts. With this module, each OF switch
acts as a SYN proxy during the TCP handshake stage of a
connection, effectively shielding the controller from possible
floods. Unfortunately, while being beneficial in the general
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case, this technique introduces new subtle vulnerabilities and
heavy limitations. Indeed, we will show that when running
Avant-Guard, the state the OF switch needs to maintain
in order to proxy each connection can lead to a new Denial
of Service attack, that we refer to as buffer saturation attack.
Furthermore, the transparency required with respect to the
end hosts limits the number of connections that the switch
can proxy to the number of available TCP port numbers.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we make the following
contributions:
• We identify and discuss some unintended vulnerabilities
of one of the recently proposed schemes against the
control plane saturation attack that, for the best of
our knowledge, represents the state-of-the-art solution
against this threat.
• We propose a novel attack, which we name buffer satu-
ration attack. Our attack exploits some of the identi-
fied vulnerabilities introduced by the state-of-the-art
solution for the control plane saturation attack. As
confirmed by our analysis, buffer saturation attack is
both realistic and simple to run, and leads to significant
network performance degradation.
• We propose LineSwitch, a new efficient and effective
solution to mitigate the control plane saturation attack.
LineSwitch greatly reduces the effects of this attack,
while at same time protects the network from the buffer
saturation attack.
• We did a preliminary evaluation of our solution, which
confirms the effectiveness of LineSwitch against the
control plane saturation attack. Moreover, our experi-
ments show a significant reduction of the time overhead
(up to 30%) when compared to the state-of-the-art.
Organization. The remaining of this paper is organized as
follows. In Section 2 we provide some background knowledge
on SDN, and on the SYN flooding attack and its possible
countermeasures. In Section 3 we revise some related work
in the area of DoS attacks and defense in Software Defined
Networking. Moreover, we provide a brief introduction of
Avant-Guard, which represents the state-of-the-art solution
against the control plane saturation attack. In Section 4 we
analyze the limitations of the current state-of-the-art, and
introduce a new possible attack, i.e., the buffer saturation
attack. Section 5 describes LineSwitch, our countermeasure
against the control plane saturation attack in SDN, while in
Section 6 we provide a preliminary evaluation of its effective-
ness. Finally, in Section 7 we draw our conclusions.
2. PRELIMINARIES
In this section we introduce some concepts that will be used
in the remaining of the paper: Software Defined Networking
(Section 2.1) and the SYN flooding attack (Section 2.2).
2.1 Software Defined Networking (SDN)
Software Defined Networking (SDN) has emerged as a new
network paradigm aimed at providing higher flexibility in
network research, development and operation. The core con-
cept behind SDN is the separation of two distinct aspects of
networking that in today’s architecture are blended together:
the network control and the forwarding functions. The SDN
architecture postulates that these two logically separated
aspects of networking are decoupled in two corresponding
layers, respectively the control plane and the data plane.
Figure 1 provides a high-level representation of the SDN
architecture.
 Control Plane
 Application Layer
SDN Application
Programmable Interface (OpenFlow)
Open APIs
SDN Controller
 Data Plane
Figure 1: SDN Architecture.
The control plane provides a directly programmable layer
that acts as an interface to the data plane for applications,
abstracting both the complexity of the underlying network in-
frastructure and the communication between the two planes.
Using the control plane as a middleware, it is possible to
easily deploy a great variety of network management appli-
cations, that act independently from the physical network
devices. Moreover, the control plane offers a logical central-
ized system that controls and accesses data from all network
devices, effectively offering a global view of the network infras-
tructure. OpenFlow (OF) [2] is the reference implementation
of the SDN paradigm. It defines a standard communication
interface between the control plane and the data plane. With
OpenFlow, the routing is performed based on traffic flows;
each OF network entity (i.e., OF switch) maintains one or
more flow tables, that are used to route incoming packets,
and an OF channel to an external controller. The control
plane can program the physical devices through a series of
flow rules [1], that are installed inside the flow tables. Such
rules specify which actions a switch will perform on a specific
network flow. For each unique network flow, or group of
flows, there will be a corresponding flow table entry (i.e., a
flow rule). Once an OF switch receives a packet, it matches
the packet header against the pipeline of its local flow ta-
bles, which will dictate what actions will be applied to that
specific flow. The control plane populates the flow tables of
each OF switch either statically, by pre-installing a set of
flow rules into the flow tables, or dynamically, by allowing a
switch-driven run-time installation of new flow rules [2]. In
the latter case, if an OF switch does not have any matching
rule for a new incoming flow, it forwards the corresponding
packet header to the controller, which at this point can install
a new rule for that flow into the switch [1]. Through the
combination of different flow rules, a controller can define a
broad range of actions, from the standard routing of a packet
to a more complex analysis, involving forwarding the packet
to the controller [1].
2.2 SYN Flooding Attack
SYN flooding attacks are one of the most widespread
and effective DoS attacks [15]. The effectiveness of a SYN
flooding attack is based on the state that TCP stacks allocate
when a connection request (i.e., a SYN packet) is received.
Such state, called Transmission Control Block (TCB) [3], is
retained in memory for a certain amount of time, even if
the TCP handshake is not completed by the client. This is
needed to handle the case in which the ACK packet, needed
to complete the connection, is lost due to network congestion.
Once a critical amount of half-open connections is reached,
the available memory reserved to the TCBs is saturated,
and no new connections can be established. In general, in
order to make it difficult for the victim to detect the attack
and its source, an attacker performs a SYN flooding attack
using spoofed IP addresses. In this way, the victim will not
be able to identify the source of the attack, and therefore,
it will not be able to automatically stop the SYN flooding.
Indeed, new incoming SYN packets could belong to legitimate
connections, which the victim can not distinguish from the
malicious traffic. Researchers and industry proposed several
countermeasures against the SYN flooding attack [4, 15].
However, none of them offers a definitive solution to this
important problem.
When applied to SDN, the SYN flooding attack does not
aim at saturating internal data structures. Rather, the goal
is to exploit data to control plane communication to saturate
the controller by generating a huge number of new network
flows. For each flow, the OF switch will have to contact the
controller, which will need to analyze the flow information,
prepare and then send an OF response to the switch. If the
rate of the flood is high enough, the controller will not be
able to keep up with the attack and will be incapacitated
from serving legitimate network flows.
3. RELATED WORK
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the main
research studies related to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks
in SDN. Due to space limitations, in this section we focus
only on DoS attacks against the control plane of an SDN
network. In [15], Peng et al. provided a first feasibility study
for Denial of Service attacks on SDN control plane. In [10],
Kreutz et al. analyzed the SDN architecture, identifying
critical aspects and possible new attack vectors, while Kloti et
al. [9] assessed some vulnerabilities that affects OpenFlow [2],
i.e., the possibility for an attacker to mount DoS attacks
on the control plane, and to disclose potentially sensitive
information by using timing analysis techniques. In [17],
Shin et al. propose Avant-Guard, a solution that addresses
architectural flows of the original OpenFlow protocol by
altering the flow management at the data plane level [8, 17].
In particular, the authors focused on solving OpenFlow’s
control plane saturation attack vulnerability. To the best
of our knowledge, Avant-Guard [17] represents the state-
of-the-art for tackling the control plane saturation attack
in SDN. For this reason, in the remaining of this section
we briefly describe this solution. We will further compare
Avant-Guard against our solution when evaluating our
proposal (see Section 6).
Avant-Guard [17] adds two extensions to the standard
OpenFlow protocol: (1) a Connection Migration module,
which limits the effect of the control plane saturation attack
based on SYN flooding by proxying the incoming TCP re-
quests, and (2) the Actuating Trigger module, which allows
the controller to limit the number of control messages re-
quired to collect network statistics. Since the focus of this
paper is on solving the control plane saturation attack, in the
remaining of this paper we will focus only on the connection
migration module of Avant-Guard, that we briefly describe
in this section. Moreover, in Section 4 we will provide a
security analysis of the connection migration module.
As introduced in Section 2.1, whenever an OF switch
receives an inbound network flow for which it has no flow rule,
it will forward the packet to the control plane. This behavior
holds even for SYN packets: indeed, for each received SYN
packet not matching a flow rule, an OF switch will contact
the controller to obtain a corresponding rule. The proposed
connection migration module of Avant-Guard addresses
this problem at the data plane level, by having the OF switch
act as a SYN proxy.
This process is articulated in four phases (see Figure 2):
Classification phase. When an OF switch receives a SYN
packet belonging to an unknown flow (action (1) in Figure 2),
instead of forwarding it to the control plane, the switch acts
as a proxy, engaging the client in a stateless TCP handshake
through SYN Cookies (actions (2) and (3) in Figure 2).
Report phase. If the client completes the TCP handshake,
the switch then forwards the new flow to the controller (action
(4) in Figure 2) and waits for a new rule that defines how it
should be handled (action (5) in Figure 2).
Migration phase. If the controller allows the migration,
the switch initiates a TCP handshake with the destination
host (actions (6), (7) and (8) in Figure 2). The OF switch
further reports the result of the handshake to the control
plane (actions (9) and (10) in Figure 2).
Relay phase. If the handshake is successful, the switch
forwards all the subsequent messages between the client and
the destination host.
Control Plane Controller
1
Data Plane Router
SYN
SYN-ACK
ACK
SYN
Host A SYN-ACK
ACK
Host B2
3
4 5 9 10
6
7
8
Figure 2: Avant-Guard [17] – Connection Migration.
The foremost advantage of connection migration, is the
classification mechanism. Only complete TCP flows will be
reported to the control plane, effectively shielding it from
SYN flooding attacks performed with spoofed IP addresses,
and greatly mitigating the threat of link saturation. For
non-spoofed TCP flows, the result is that any {IP, port}
combination will appear to be valid, effectively converting the
network to a whitehole network and preventing an attacker
from mapping possible targets. Moreover, the consequent
SYN flooding vulnerability at data plane level is addressed by
the use of SYN Cookies [7]. Since the SYN Cookie algorithm
does not need to maintain state for connection requests, there
is no need for storing information in the OF switch for failed
TCP connections.
Generally, it is possible to infer the use of connection mi-
gration by analyzing the round trip time of a SYN packet.
An adversary might use this information to flood the data
plane with complete TCP handshakes, forcing the switch
to forward each of them to the control plane. To solve this
issue, Avant-Guard provides a modification to the basic
connection migration module, namely delayed connection
migration [17], which requires the initiator of the communi-
cation to send the first valid packet, before forwarding the
packer header to the control plane.
4. LIMITATIONS OF THE CONNECTION
MIGRATION MODULE
The connection migration module of Avant-Guard [17]
is indeed a valid solution against the control plane satura-
tion attack. Moreover it also shields end hosts from SYN
flooding attacks and, by replying unconditionally to every
received SYN packet, it prevents port scanning attacks. Un-
fortunately, along with the above desirable properties, the
connection migration module of Avant-Guard introduces
new vulnerabilities too. In particular, we identified two dis-
tinct vulnerabilities that can lead to a shutdown of the OF
switch. First, the state that the switch must keep in order
to implement the connection migration module of Avant-
Guard can be exploited by an attacker, which can try to
fill the allotted buffers and incapacitate the OF switch (see
Section 4.1). Second, the use of SYN proxy limits the num-
ber of connections that can be forwarded. In particular,
the maximum number of connections forwarded to a specific
{IP, port} pair is 64513 (see Section 4.2).
In what follows we provide an in-depth analysis, as well as
the scheme for possible attacks, for each of the above points.
4.1 Proxying Requires State
A switch implementing the connection migration module of
Avant-Guard needs to maintain some state, for the whole
duration of the TCP connection. In particular, acting as a
proxy between two communicating hosts, A and B, a switch
R should execute the following three operations:
(1) Once received a SYN packet from host A, with Initial
Sequence Number [3] ISNA, R will respond with a SYN-ACK
packet with a spoofed address, i.e., using host B address. The
ACK sequence number will be ISNA + 1 and the sequence
number will be a random number ISNR. Note that, according
to TCP protocol specifications [5, 13] each ISN is computed
in a non-predictable way. Therefore, it is impossible for R to
predict the ISN that B would generate and, as a consequence
ISNR will be different from the sequence number B will use.
(2) Upon receiving the permission to migrate the connec-
tion, switch R will start a handshake with host B by sending
a SYN packet with sequence number ISNA. Note that at
this stage, R must use its IP address to establish the TCP
session since it has no guarantees that the reply from host B
will follow the same path through switch R on the way back.
(3) Once the SYN-ACK packet from host B (with an
ACK number ISNA + 1 and a sequence number ISNB) is
received, switch R finalizes the connection sending an ACK
with number ISNB + 1 to B.
To maintain the connection migration transparent to the
end hosts, R must perform a sequence number translation
(and analogously an ACK translation), for the packets ex-
changed by A and B. Moreover, for each host connecting to
the same {IP, port} pair, the switch needs to use a distinct
port number to migrate the connection in order to later
match the response packets to the correct host on the way
back. Consequently, for each connection the switch needs to
store the following information:
{IPsrc, portsrc, portR, δseq},
where IPsrc and portsrc are respectively source address
and port of the initiator of the connection, portR is the port
number used by the router in the migration and δseq is the
difference between the ISN used by the router and the ISN
used by the destination host.
The translation table required by the switch to act as a
proxy gives an attacker an easy mean for mounting a buffer
saturation attack. Indeed, the attacker simply needs to open
several complete TCP connections through the target OF
switch to a given host. Note that each of these connections
will need state to be stored on the switch for translation.
Therefore, if the number of connections is large enough, the
portion of memory dedicated to that data structure will be
saturated, incapacitating the switch from serving any further
valid connection.
4.2 Limit on the Number of Connections
As we already stated in Section 4.1, when a connection
from hosts A to B is proxied by switch R, all the packets
translated by the switch to the destination B will have the
IP address of R and a port number which will be different
from the original one used by A. This behavior introduces
yet another important problem: if there are several clients
attempting to connect to a given destination on the same port
(e.g., {IPB , portB}) through switch R, the latter will need to
use a different port for each outgoing connection. However,
since TCP port numbers are 16 bit fields, the maximum
number of connections the switch will be able to migrate to a
given IP-port pair is at most 216−1024 = 64512 (the first 1024
ports are reserved for well known services). This number can
be quickly reached if we consider extremely popular HTTP
services (e.g., Google or Facebook). Therefore, each switch is
bound to a maximum number of connections it can migrate
for each service, after which all new incoming connection
requests can not be satisfied.
The limited number of available ports can easily be ex-
ploited by an attacker to mount DoS attacks. In fact, it
would be easy to target a given service by opening a series
of long-lasting connections through the OF switch. Once
enough connections are opened and all the possible ports
have been used by the switch to migrate the connections,
any other client trying to connect to said service will be re-
jected. This bound on the maximum number of connections
that a switch can migrate, provides a simple and efficient
way of mounting a DoS attack to a given host B, for all
the clients whose path to B passes through the same OF
switch. There are no definitive solutions to this problem if
proxying is used: each connection to the same service must
be assigned a unique port number by the switch. The most
promising way to somewhat mitigate this restriction is to
purchase several IP addresses for the switch to use. In this
way, when the OF switch consumes all the available ports
with a given address, it will switch to a new address, this
way being able to migrate other 64512 connections. While
address purchasing can be employed as a partial solution, it
is worth noting that for each additional address, the space of
possible combinations increases by just 64512. If we consider
a complex network, where several switches employ the con-
nection migration technique, we will quickly hit a point where
the cost and complexity of management increase extremely
rapidly, reducing the appeal of this workaround.
5. OUR SOLUTION: LINESWITCH
Breaking TCP end-to-end semantics introduces the need
to store state, which in turn opens the system to attacks
exploiting buffer saturation. Therefore, there is a strong
need to reduce its use as much as possible while retaining
its beneficial effects against control plane saturation attacks.
To reach this goal, we propose LineSwitch, an OpenFlow
extension intended for edge OF switches of a network. The
idea is the following: LineSwitch proxies all incoming TCP
connections from a given IP until one is completed, while for
all subsequent SYN packets the proxy is used with a small
probability Pp.
Our solution effectively protects the switch even in presence
of an attacker E with knowledge about the proxy mechanism
in use. Indeed, it would be possible for E to perform an
attack by correctly completing the handshake associated
with the first SYN packet sent, and then initiating the SYN
flooding. Although this is true, E would be forced to use
its real IP address in all the packets, to ensure they will
be forwarded to the OF pipeline. Otherwise, they will be
proxied by the switch, and therefore discarded. Moreover,
since the effectiveness of the SYN flooding attack is based
on a high throughput, once E is forced to use its real IP
address for the flooding, the OF switch will quickly proxy
one of the packets, thus detecting the attack. Then, the
OF switch can blacklist the IP address of host E, IPE , for
T ×2countIPE seconds, where countIPE indicates the number
of times IPE did not complete a connection, and T represents
a default time value.
With our approach, all packets with spoofed IP addresses
will be blocked at the data plane, and malicious clients
that initiate SYN flooding with non-spoofed IPs (after first
establishing a complete TCP connection) will be penalized
with rapidly increasing blacklist periods of time.
Our approach provides two major improvements with re-
spect to the problems identified in the state-of-the-art (see
Section 4). The first advantage of our approach is that it
drastically reduces the memory usage needed to perform the
address/port translation for each connection, thus offering
protection against the described buffer saturation attack (see
Section 4.1). Indeed, LineSwitch requires port translation
only for the first SYN packet per each IP address, and only
for a very small number of packets after that based on the cho-
sen probability Pp. Therefore, the memory usage increases
roughly linearly with the number of clients with a TCP
connection through the switch R. In contrast, the memory
overhead introduced by Avant-Guard grows linearly with
the number of connections that passe through the switch. An
attacker can easily generate a huge number of connections
from the same source IP using different port numbers (up
to 216 = 65535 per < IPdst, portdst > pair; the theoretical
limit would then be 216+32+16) and, with Avant-Guard, the
switch would need to store state for each of these connections.
As a reference, in our experiments with a link of 1 Mbps
we were able to open approximately 780 connections per
second, while with a higher bandwidth of 5 Mbps, it was
possible to complete more than 4000 connections per second.
Instead, with LineSwitch the number of entries the switch
needs to store under attack, is roughly proportional to the
number of distinct real IP addresses (machines) the attacker
possesses. As a consequence, the effect of buffer saturation
attacks is greatly reduced, while at the same time retaining
full protection against SYN flooding attacks.
A second major advantage with respect to the state-of-
the-art is that LineSwitch proxies a minimum number of
connections. Indeed, as discussed in Section 4, while be-
ing an effective mechanism to protect against SYN flooding
attacks, proxying introduces several problems which derive
from breaking the end-to-end paradigm. Therefore, its use
should be limited as much as possible. LineSwitch proxies
only the first connection from a given host (i.e., an IP ad-
dress), and subsequent connections from the same host with
probability Pp. Since, in general, the migration probability
value Pp is small (see Section 6), LineSwitch will assure in
most cases the normal network flow, mitigating intrinsic
problems of proxying such as limited maximum number of
migrated connections (see Section 4.2). Moreover, our experi-
mental results show that a small value for Pp does not reduce
the level of protection that LineSwitch provides against the
control plane saturation attack (see Section 6).
6. PRELIMINARY EVALUATION
In order to assess the effectiveness of LineSwitch against
the control plane saturation attack, and its resiliency to buffer
saturation attacks, we designed preliminary experiments on
the setting shown in Figure 3. Our system model includes
three hosts connected to an OF switch running the refer-
ence OpenFlow software switch [14], and a local controller
(running the POX controller, l3_learning module [16]). We
ran all our experiments using the Mininet network simula-
tor [12] in a virtual machine. We compared LineSwitch to
the state-of-the-art solution to tackle SYN flooding-based
control plane saturation attack, i.e., Avant-Guard [17]. The
computer used for the simulation is equipped with a quad
core Intel i5-4670 @3.40GHz, all of which were available to
the virtual machine.
Client
Attack
er
Controller
Router
Web Server
Link 1
Link
 2
Link 3
Figure 3: Experimental Setup.
We simulated the behavior of both Avant-Guard and
LineSwitch under the buffer saturation attack introduced
in Section 5. To this aim, we configured the system with
different buffer sizes and run the attack at different rates. As
a result, we demonstrate that: (1) the attack rate required to
successfully incapacitate an OpenFlow switch running Avant-
Guard grows linearly with the size of the buffer; (2) when
using Avant-Guard, the throughput needed to successfully
complete the attack in a reasonable amount of time is easily
achievable, even with larger buffers; (3) LineSwitch offers
an extremely high resiliency to the buffer saturation attack,
and can be further configured through the Pp parameter to
address the specific needs of the network.
In order to directly assess the relation between attack
bandwidth and time required to saturate the buffer, we set
the RTT is set to 0ms, for each link in Figure 3. In any case,
since the attacker continuously floods the switch with new
connections, the RTT would have been relevant just until
the first connection were completed. Figure 4 presents the
results of our simulation. It shows the average time needed to
successfully overload a switch with a buffer saturation attack,
running both Avant-Guard and LineSwitch, with the latter
executed with parameter Pp set to 0.01 and 0.05. The results
are presented for varying size of the buffer (expressed in
Bytes) and for different rates of attack (expressed in Mbps).
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Figure 4: Average buffer saturation time, varying buffer
size and attack bandwidth, under a buffer saturation attack.
Time on y-axis is in logarithmic scale.
As Figure 4 shows, even with a modest rate of attack it is
possible to quickly overflow the buffer of a switch running
Avant-Guard: with an attack rate of 1 Mbps, a buffer of
222 Bytes is saturated in 74.718 sec, preventing the switch
from migrating any new connection. By contrast when using
LineSwitch, even when setup with a highly conservative
migration probability Pp = 0.05, the time needed to perform
a successful buffer saturation attack is one order of magnitude
greater when compared to Avant-Guard. As an example,
with a 1 Mbps attack rate, a buffer size of 222 Bytes and Pp =
0.05, LineSwitch requires 769.487 sec to be saturated against
only 74.718 sec required when running Avant-Guard. When
using lower (and more realistic) migration probability values,
the time difference increases even more, as shown in Figure 4.
For completeness, we compared the average overhead in-
troduced by Avant-Guard with the overhead introduced by
LineSwitch, evaluating both a scenario without attack, and a
scenario under SYN flooding based control plane saturation
attack. All overhead data is expressed with respect to the
standard OpenFlow protocol, under normal network condi-
tions (e.g., no attacks performed). We sampled the time
required by the legitimate client (see Figure 3) to download
a web page of size 1 KB from the web server. In the regular
traffic scenario, Avant-Guard introduces an average time
overhead of 41.83%, while LineSwitch incurs only a 7.67%
overhead. Moreover, under control plane saturation attack
with an attack rate of 6.5 Mbps, Avant-Guard introduces
an overhead of 36.92%, while LineSwitch introduces only a
5.45% overhead. Finally, under control plane saturation at-
tack, both Avant-Guard and LineSwitch guarantee a 100%
page retrieval success rate.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper we analyzed the effects of the control plane
saturation attack based on SYN flooding, one of the most
widespread types of denial of service attack, when applied
to Software Defined Networks (SDN) architecture, and in
particular to its reference implementation, OpenFlow. We
showed that the extensive communication needed by the
control plane and the data plane in SDN amplifies the effect
of typical denial of service attacks, resulting in an overload
of the control plane and in the possible impairment of large
parts of the network. Furthermore we considered Avant-
Guard [17], which is, to the best of our knowledge, the only
currently proposed solution against control plane saturation
attack. We showed that in its original design, subtle points
were not taken into consideration, opening critical system vul-
nerabilities. To this aim we proposed LineSwitch, a solution
based on probability and blacklisting which offers both re-
siliency against SYN flooding-based control plane saturation
attacks and protection from buffer saturation vulnerabilities.
Our preliminary evaluation demonstrates that LineSwitch
imposes a negligible overhead, which can be dynamically ad-
justed to fit the network needs, while successfully defending
the OpenFlow switch and controller from attacks that can
potentially disrupt the functionality of the network.
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